ABSTRACT A large body of research indicates that child development is sensitive to early-life environments, so that poor children are at higher risk for poor cognitive and behavioral outcomes. These developmental outcomes are, in turn, important determinants of success in adulthood. Yet, remarkably little is known about whether poverty alleviation programs improve children's developmental outcomes. We examine how a government-run cash transfer program for poor mothers in rural Ecuador influenced the development of young children. Random assignment at the parish level is used to identify the program's effects. Our data include a set of measures of cognitive ability that are not typically included in experimental or quasi-experimental studies of the impact of cash transfers on child well-being, as well as a set of physical health measures that may be related to developmental outcomes. The cash transfer program had positive, although modest, effects on the physical, cognitive, and socio-emotional development of children, but effects were substantially larger for poorer children.
I. Introduction
Poor health and delayed cognitive development in early childhood have long-lasting consequences. Studies from developed countries that have tracked children into adulthood show that healthier and taller children do better on tests of cognitive ability; these children grow into taller adults, and earn significantly higher wages (Case and Paxson, 2006; Currie and Thomas, 1999) . In poor countries, childhood developmental outcomes are also important for future success. A recent review paper shows that early cognitive development is a strong predictor of school attainment in Guatemala, South Africa, the Philippines, Jamaica and Brazil, even after controlling for wealth and maternal education (Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007) .
A large body of research stresses that there may be large payoffs from investments in early childhood development, especially for children who live in impoverished environments.
Scientific evidence for early "sensitive periods," during which brain development is especially dependent on environmental conditions, has motivated economic theories of skill formation in which early investments increase the productivity of later investments (Knudsen et al. 2006; Cunha et al. 2005) . Children who miss critical investments at young ages, either because their parents lack resources or knowledge about parenting practices, are thought to be at elevated risk of "adult failure" (Heckman, 2006) . Although there is fairly broad consensus that investments during early childhood are important for developmental outcomes, little is known about which specific types of interventions are likely to be most effective in very poor environments. Much of the research in the United States and other developed countries has focused on pre-school interventions, which provide young children with enriched environments outside of the home. (Recent assessments of this research include Anderson 2005 and Currie 2001 .) Although pre-school interventions are also available in many developing countries, including some in Latin America, the coverage of these programs in rural areas is frequently low.
1 In contrast, cash transfer programs that raise the living standards of poor families are becoming increasingly popular across the developing world.
An important question is whether these programs improve children's developmental outcomes. If so, then poverty alleviation programs may be more than "stop gap" policies, but instead may have large long-run effects on well-being.
In this paper we analyze the impact of a program that transfers cash to women in rural Ecuador on measures of early childhood development. These transfers are small-only $15 per month per family-but they represent a non-trivial 10 percent increase in family expenditure for the average eligible family. Random assignment was built into the roll-out of the program, so we are able to evaluate the impact of transfers on child outcomes with very few assumptions.
An unusual feature of this evaluation is that we examine the effects of transfers on a set of measures of cognitive and social development, in addition to physical health measures that may be related to developmental outcomes. It is rare to have measures of cognitive development for a large sample of children from a developing country. There is only a small literature, discussed below, that examines how economic status is related to children's cognitive development in poor countries. Although there are numerous studies that assess the effects of specific health interventions, such as feeding supplementation and cognitive stimulation, on children's cognitive development, these generally involve relatively small and sometimes select samples of children.
2 Several recent larger-scale studies examine the effects of de-worming and iron supplementation on children's school attendance (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Bobonis, Miguel and Puri-Sharma, 2007) . Although school attendance is an important outcome in its own right, these studies do not show whether the programs improved children's cognitive ability, 1 Examples of evaluations of these programs include Behrman et al. (2004) for a program in Bolivia, Berlinski et al. (2006) on Argentina, and Attanasio and Vera-Hernández (2004) for a community nursery program in Colombia. Schady (2006) reviews the literature for Latin America. 2 See, for example, McKay et al. 1978; Waber et al. 1981; Grantham-McGregor et al. 1991 and Martorell, Habicht and Rivera, 1995; Powell et al. 2004. possibly making schooling more productive, or whether the gains in attendance were due to reduced illness that kept children out of school. More generally, we know of no experimental studies in developing countries that have examined the impact of cash transfer programs on children's cognitive ability.
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II. Background
There are a priori reasons to believe that cash transfers will improve developmental outcomes among children in developing countries. In virtually every developing country, infants and children from poorer families are more likely to be stunted or wasted, and to experience a variety of illness conditions such as diarrhea, respiratory infections and measles (see, for example, Desai and Alva, 1998 and Haddad et al., 2003 , which provide evidence on a large number of countries). These physical health conditions can impair cognitive development. There is also some direct evidence that poorer children have worse development outcomes. Gertler and Fernald (2004) show that, among low-income Mexican children, those that are poorer have smaller vocabularies than other children of the same age, and also score worse on several tests of cognitive development. Paxson and Schady (2007) show that age-adjusted vocabulary size in Ecuador is smaller among children from less-wealthy families, and the wealth gradient in vocabulary size for older children is larger than that for younger children. An association between low socioeconomic status and poor child development has also been found among children 12 months and younger in Egypt, Brazil and India, and among toddlers in Bangladesh (see the review by Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007) . These associations are attributed to a variety of factors, including poor nutrition, exposure to infectious diseases, and environments that are not stimulating.
3 Recently, information has been collected on the cognitive and behavioral outcomes of children from the Oportunidades study. Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2006) conclude that larger transfers resulted in better nutritional status, improved motor skills, and higher levels of cognitive development. However, these measures were collected too long after the control group had been folded into the program for the authors to use the initial random assignment for identification.
The fact that socioeconomic "gradients" in child health and development are observed in cross-sectional data suggests that cash transfers to families may improve children's outcomes.
However, there are obvious difficulties extrapolating from associations to the likely effects of cash transfers. On the one hand, the gradient may reflect factors such as unobserved parental health or ability, which both allow parents to earn higher incomes and have children who have better health and development outcomes. In this case, the effects of cash transfers could be smaller than those suggested by the cross-sectional income gradients. On the other hand, cash transfers could have large-than-expected effects, if they are spent disproportionately on goods and services that benefit children. This could happen if families behave as if the transfers are "earmarked" for children-possibly because of the way the transfers are marketed-or because the women to whom transfers are given have spending preferences that favor children.
In addition to evidence on income gradients in child health and development, there is a growing literature that is directly concerned with the effects of cash transfers on child health.
This research examines both transfers that are given unconditionally, as well as those that are conditioned on specific parental behaviors such as enrolling children in school or taking them to health center visits. In general, the evidence indicates that cash transfers benefit children's physical health. A number of papers examine the impact of South African transfer programs, using quasi-experimental methods (Duflo, 2003 , Case, 2001 Agüero, Carter, and Woolard, 2006) . All of these studies report positive program effects on health outcomes-for example, Duflo (2003) shows that girls whose grandmothers receive transfers have large improvements in weight and height. Several studies based on randomized-design evaluations indicate that after about 18 months, children whose families received received cash transfers from the Oportunidades program in Mexico were about 1 centimeter taller than comparable children who did not receive the transfers, although the findings are somewhat sensitive to the choice of sample and estimation method (Gertler, 2004; Behrman and Hoddinott, 2005; Rivera et al., 2004) . Conditional cash transfer programs have also been found to have positive effects on child nutritional status in Nicaragua (Maluccio and Flores, 2004) and, among younger children in rural areas, in Colombia (Attanasio et al., 2005) , but not in Honduras (Hoddinott, 2004) or Brazil (Morris et al., 2004) . However, none of these studies include measures of child cognitive development.
This paper, which assesses the effects of a cash transfer program on the development of children between the ages of 3 and 7 in rural Ecuador, adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, we collected information on an unusually large number of outcomes. Children were given a comprehensive battery of tests aimed at measuring their nutritional status and their cognitive and motor abilities, and their mothers were asked to report on their behavior problems.
Taken together, these data permit a broad assessment of how cash transfers influence health and development. Second, unlike several of the previous Latin American studies discussed above, receipt of the cash transfers was not conditional on health center visits. This design feature makes it somewhat easier to assess whether the effects of the program are due to the receipt of cash rather than to direct the effects of health center visits. Last, because we have information on the use of health care services, as well as on the parenting behaviors and physical and mental health of the childrens' mothers, we are able to provide some evidence on the likely mechanisms underlying the program's effects on children.
III. Experimental Design and Data Collection
The Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) program
In 2003, the Ecuadorian government began restructuring its social assistance programs. Transfers are given to mothers rather than fathers, and are distributed through the banking system, although beneficiaries do not need to have a bank account to receive them.
The experiment
Current BDH beneficiaries consist of two groups-those who had received transfers from the Bono Solidario and were "re-certified", and new families who became eligible for the first time. The process of adding new families to the roster of those eligible for the BDH and initiating transfers was rolled out slowly across the country, providing us with an opportunity to randomize parishes into a treatment group and a control group. We selected six of the 22 provinces in Ecuador-three coastal provinces and three provinces in the highlands-in which to conduct the study. These provinces were not selected randomly, but instead were chosen because roll-out of the program had not started when our baseline data were collected. 6 Together, these provinces contain 378 parishes. (The parish is the smallest administrative unit in Ecuador, roughly equal to a village in rural areas.) These parishes were stratified into urban and rural groups. A total of 118 parishes were selected: 51 rural and 28 urban treatment parishes, and 26 rural and 13 urban control parishes.
For a variety of administrative reasons, the sample of households drawn for this study included families in the first or second Selben quintile who had children age 0 to 6 at baseline, had no older siblings, and had not received the Bono Solidario program-see the Appendix for details. As a result of these restrictions, the families in our sample are not representative of all BDH-eligible families in the six provinces chosen. Specifically, families in our sample tend to be younger (because of the exclusion of households with older children). They may also be less "pushy" or less able to "work the system" than those who had gained entrance to the Bono Solidario program. Although this may limit the extent to which we can extrapolate from our results to all BDH-eligible families in Ecuador, we do not think this is a serious threat to the external validity of our results. It was the exception rather than the norm for young families to have received the Bono Solidario. As shown in Appendix Table 1 , more than 80 percent of poor families without older children had not received the Bono Solidario prior to the recertification:
because of financial constraints that prevailed during the last years of the old program, few new families were able to enroll. In addition, because both treatment and control households were 6 Provinces in the interior jungle were excluded because of their low population density and the difficulty of data collection.
randomly drawn from a common sample frame, there is no concern with the internal validity of the estimated effects of BDH transfers. Table 2 indicate that baseline family and child characteristics are similar across those who were and were not found at follow-up.
The randomization of the program was a success, in that take-up of the transfer among families in the control group was minimal. The fraction of treatment families who received transfers climbed quickly once the program became available, reaching 56 percent by January 2005 and 60 percent by January 7 Of these, 12 families (1.1%) are reported to have received transfers in the five months prior to the rollout of the new program. A similar fraction of families from treatment parishes was reported to have received transfers prior to June. This could be due to mistakes in the banking records. Alternatively, it could be that some families that were not "newly eligible" were mistakenly included in the sample, because of errors in the government's records of who was and was not receiving the Bono Solidario.
2006. Actual program take-up was higher. Eligible families are not required to withdraw their (who we study in this paper) were eligible for the transfer for 17 months prior to the follow-up survey.
Outcome measures
The main results presented in this paper are based on a sample of 1,479 children who were 3 to 7 years old at the follow-up survey, whose families were interviewed in both the baseline and follow-up surveys, and for whom data is available for each of the eight measures of physical and cognitive development we discuss below. 8 As a robustness check, we also present results that include 780 children who are missing at least one outcome.
We group outcomes into five cognitive and behavioral outcomes and three physical outcomes.
Cognitive and behavioral outcomes: We use five measures of cognitive and behavioral outcomes. The first is the Test de Vocabulario en Imágenes Peabody (TVIP), the Spanish version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), a widely-used test of receptive vocabulary that was administered to children ages 36 months and older. 9 Children's cognitive abilities were assessed using three tests drawn from the Woodcock-Johnson-Muñoz battery (Woodcock and Muñoz-Sandoval, 1996) . These scales have been used to assess the effects of interventions in 8 We excluded 46 children whose mothers did not speak Spanish. The language-based developmental tests were not available in indigenous languages. 9 See, for example, Umbel et al. (1992) ; Baydar and Brooks-Gunn (1991) ; Blau and Grossberg (1992) ; Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994); Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2006); and Paxson and Schady (2007) .
early childhood on cognitive development in a variety of contexts. 10 The first is a test of longterm memory (which we denote WJ-1, since it is the first test in the battery). Children are gradually "introduced" to a series of space creatures with nonsensical names, and then are shown groups of space creatures which they are asked to identify. The second (denoted WJ-2) measures short-term memory, or immediate recall. The interviewer reads the child increasingly complex sentences, which the child repeats back. The final cognitive test (WJ-5) measures visual integration, or visual-spatial processing. Children are shown a series of pictures of common objects that have been distorted in various ways-for example, a picture of a boat with several of the lines missing, or with a pattern superimposed on top of the picture-and are asked to identify the object. Finally, we assessed behavior problems with a commonly-used scale, which is based on mother's reports of the frequency that a child displays each of 29 behaviors.
Physical outcomes: We consider three measures of physical development: the child's hemoglobin level, height-for-age, and fine motor control. These measures were chosen because they have been linked to developmental outcomes. For example, numerous studies report an association between cognitive development and malnutrition (Powell et al., 1995; Pollitt, Watkins, and Husaini, 1997) and iron deficiency (Lozoff, Jimenez, and Hagen, 2000; GranthamMcGregor and Ani, 2001; Stoltzfus, Kvalsvig, and Chwaya, 2001) . Children with helminth infections, which are common in Ecuador, are more likely to be malnourished and to have iron deficient anemia, which may compromise their ability to learn (Dickson, Awasthi, and Williamson, 2000; Miguel and Kremer, 2004) . Other research indicates that fine motor control in young children is affected by nutrition and psychosocial stimulation (Grantham-McGregor et al., 1997 ). Although we classify fine motor control as a physical outcome, it could also be considered a cognitive outcome because it requires planning and attention (in addition to muscle strength and coordination) to conduct the task.
Hemoglobin was measured using a finger-prick blood draw. We used information on the elevations of each of the parishes to convert these to elevation-adjusted measures, using procedures published by the Centers for Disease Control (Centers for Disease Control, 1989).
Heights were measured using stadiometers. In some of the results that follow, we convert heights to age-and sex-adjusted z-scores using US norms. 11 Fine motor control was assessed using a pegboard exercise. Children were asked to put pegs into a pegboard, twice using their dominant hand and twice using their non-dominant hand. These four times were averaged together. The final score is measured in seconds, so that lower values indicate faster times.
Maternal outcomes: We also collected data on a number of measures of mother's physical and mental health. The first is a measure of the mother's hemoglobin level, which is adjusted for both elevation and pregnancy. The second is the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CESD), a widely-used measure of depression (Radloff, 1977) . The third is a measure of maternal punitiveness and lack of warmth. This consists of 8 interviewer-assessed items, and is based on the HOME scale (Bradley, 1993; Paxson and Schady, 2007) . The last measure is the mother's score on the 4-item version of the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). This is a frequently-used measure of the extent to which life events are perceived to be stressful (Cohen et al., 1983) .
Two final measures we use are based on the mother's report of her subjective social status, using the "MacArthur ladders". 12 Mothers were shown a picture of a ladder with 10 rungs, and were told that higher rungs correspond to higher socioeconomic status. They were asked to 11 Height-for-age z-scores were computed using growth charts produced by the Centers for Disease Control. place themselves on the ladder in relation to everyone in their communities, and in relation to everyone in Ecuador. We use the ladder scores as crude measures of economic status. The "community" and "Ecuador" ladders provide information on whether the subjective standing of those in the treatment group increases relative to those in the control group.
Log per capita expenditures: In the analysis that follows, we examine whether there is heterogeneity in treatment effects across more and less poor families. The baseline survey collected information on housing characteristics and ownership of a list of household durables, but did not include an expenditure module. A companion study of the effects of the BDH on the educational attainment of older children (conducted in different parishes) collected the same information on housing and durables, and included an expenditure module (Schady and Araujo, 2006; Schady and Rosero, 2007) . We used data from this study to estimate a regression of the logarithm of monthly expenditure on measures of housing characteristics, durable goods ownership and several household characteristics such as the household head's age and education level, and household size, and used the resulting coefficients to impute the logarithm of expenditure at baseline for our sample.
IV. Methods
The results in this paper are based on intent-to-treat estimates, using regressions of the following form:
(1)
where k Y is the kth child outcome (out of 8), T is a treatment indicator which takes on the value of one for children in parishes randomly assigned to receive the BDH in the early roll-out phase, and X is a set of controls (including an intercept). To make it easier to draw comparisons across outcomes, we first converted each outcome into a within-sample z-score by subtracting the sample median and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. 13 Also, we reversed the signs on the measures of fine motor control and the behavioral problem index, so that higher values correspond to "better" outcomes (as with the other outcomes). The coefficients on the treatment indicator therefore measure effect sizes in standard deviation units. In most specifications, X includes only indicators for the child's age, in single month indicators, and an indicator for the child's gender. As a robustness check, we also show results that include controls for a set of baseline family characteristics, including the log of imputed expenditure, an indicator for whether the mother lived with a husband at baseline, the mother's years of education and age, and indicators for the numbers of family members in 5 age ranges (0 to 5, 6 to 14, 15 to 44, 45 to 64 and 64 or older) crossed with gender, and the mother's TVIP score. 14 All standard errors throughout the paper are clustered at the parish level.
We also estimate the average treatment effect, across all 8 outcome measures, and for the subsets of 5 cognitive and behavioral outcomes and 3 physical outcomes:
In practice, we estimate (1) by running seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for all 8 outcomes, and using the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimates to calculate the standard error of α (see Katz, Kling, and Ludwig, 2007; Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer, 2007) .
These averages provide useful summary measures of the effects of the program, and have the advantage that they may be more precisely estimated than the individual treatment effects.
As we show below, there is clear evidence that the relationship between outcomes and expenditures is nonlinear, implying that the effects of transfers may also differ across poorer and wealthier families in our sample. Other cash transfer programs have generally been found to have larger effects on schooling and health outcomes among poorer children (for example, Rivera et al., 2004 on the Oportunidades program in Mexico; Maluccio and Flores, 2004 , on the Red de Protección Social program in Nicaragua; Filmer and Schady, 2007 , on a cash transfer program in Cambodia). We therefore estimate variants of (1) that permit the effects of the transfer to differ for families in the lowest quartile of the per capita expenditure distribution, and the rest of the sample.
15 Specifically, we estimate:
where j Q indicates which group the family belongs to.
V. Results
Sample means and socioeconomic gradients in child outcomes
We first examine whether there are differences at baseline between families in the treatment and control groups. Several features of the results, shown in Table 1 , are notable. First, differences in baseline characteristics between the treatment and control groups are small in magnitude and never significant-as one would expect if assignment was in fact random. This is true for the sample as a whole, as well as for families and children in the poorest quartile of per capita expenditures.
Second, the Children have relatively young mothers (around 23 to 24 years old on average) with around 7 years of completed schooling on average. A large fraction of mothers completed exactly 6 years of schooling, indicating that they did not progress beyond primary school. Finally, many children had significant health problems at baseline. The average height-for-age z-score, computed using US norms, is around -1.1, and 27.2 percent of the children are stunted (have a z-score less than -2). The average level of hemoglobin is 10.4, and 68.4 percent of children in our sample were anemic at baseline. 16 The mean standardized TVIP (receptive language) score at baseline for children in the sample is 82.9, more than one standard deviation below the mean of 100 for the sample of children that were used to norm the test.
Nonparametric evidence
We start by presenting non-parametric regressions of each of our outcomes on the sharply for children in the lowest quartile of the distribution of per capita expenditure; at higher expenditure levels, outcomes improve more slowly or do not improve at all. 16 Using CDC guidelines, the cut-offs for anemia are 11.1 g/dl for children between the ages of 2 and 5, and 11.5 for children between 5 and 8 (Centers for Disease Control, 1989) .
The results in the figure indicate that the cash transfers improved several developmental and health outcomes, especially for the poorest children. For all outcomes except height, the curves for children in the treatment group lie above those for children in the control group over some range of expenditure measures. For most of these outcomes, the curves diverge for children in the poorest quartile. For two outcomes-fine motor control and long-term memory (WJ-1)-
the curves for children in the treatment group lie above those for children in the control group at all expenditure levels. In what follows, we quantify these effects for the sample as a whole, and for the poorest children in the sample. Table 2 presents the main results on BDH treatment effects for the sample as a whole.
Main results of BDH treatment effects
These effects are modest. The estimated treatment effects for individual outcomes are statistically significant only for fine motor control, which is predicted to be 15.9 percent of a standard deviation higher among the treatment group than in the control group, and long-term These results are similar. One difference is that the estimated effect on the treatment on visual integration, which was not statistically significant in the first specification, is larger and significant when the additional controls are included.
Plausibly, two of the outcomes-height and the TVIP score-cannot be expected to change substantially over short periods for children past infancy. 17 Height is a "stock" which reflects the accumulated effects of nutrition and disease over the child's life. Similarly, the TVIP score measures language accumulation over childhood, and reflects both cognitive ability and language exposure. When these two variables are excluded from the estimates of average effects, the sizes rise to 0.126 (0.069) for cognitive and behavioral outcomes, 0.135 (0.067) for physical outcomes, and 0.129 (0.060) for all measures. These result simply that the short-run impact of the program may be larger than the more conservative estimates shown in the table.
We next turn to results that allow program effects to vary by expenditure group. These results, shown in Table To test the robustness of our main results, we present two variants of these estimates in Table 4 . The left-hand panel shows results that are estimated using the largest sample possible for each outcome, so that the sample size varies across outcomes. Approximately one-third of children are missing data on one or more outcomes. The outcome with the most missing values (20 percent of the sample) was hemoglobin, due mainly to the reluctance of mothers to allow the finger prick. The second most frequently missing outcome (11.6 percent of the sample) was the test of visual integration (WJ-5), which was the last cognitive test that was administered.
Children in the treatment group were as likely as those in the control group to have missing outcomes: In a regression of a dummy for missing at least one outcome on treated children, the coefficient on the treatment indicator is 0.02, with a standard error of 0.06. The statistics shown in Appendix Table 2 indicate few differences in baseline characteristics between the full sample of families and children and those who had no missing child outcome measures.
The results using the largest possible sample for each outcome also indicate substantial treatment effects among the poorest children. However, the effects are between 25 and 50 percent smaller than those shown in Table 3 , which are based on the sample of children with no missing values for any outcome.
This difference in the treatment effects across samples is somewhat puzzling. It is possible that children for whom some outcomes are missing are, for some unobserved reason, less amenable to treatment. Evidence consistent with this idea is presented in Appendix Table 3, which compares mean outcomes for children with no missing outcomes (who are included in the analyses in Tables 2 and 3) , with mean outcomes for children with at least one missing outcome (who are excluded from the analyses in Tables 2 and 3 ). These results indicate that children with at least one missing outcome tend to score worse than others on their observed outcomes, even after adjusting for age. It may be that, when examining only children for whom all test results are available, we have excluded children with the worst health and developmental outcomes who may have benefited least from cash transfers.
The right-hand panel of Table 4 uses published norms to standardize the measures of child height, the TVIP, and the three tests from the Woodcock-Johnson battery. 18 The normed scores are transformed into within-sample z-scores, as before. Using published norms rather than the raw scores has a negligible effect on our estimated treatment effects.
Health care use
There are a number of ways in which receiving cash transfers could have affected children's developmental and health outcomes. One possibility is that, because of the higher income levels produced by the transfers, parents in the treatment group made greater use of health services that protect children from malnutrition and disease, both of which can influence health and development. Although visits to public clinics in Ecuador are free, it may be that cash transfers defray transportation costs or make it possible to attend higher-quality private clinics. In addition, although the BDH was not a conditional cash transfer program, the government had originally planned to make receipt of the transfers conditional on taking pre-school children for regular visits to health clinics. This conditionality was never implemented. However, 28 percent of mothers in our sample answered "yes" to the question of whether receipt of the BDH was conditional, and 62 percent of these said it was conditional on taking children to health clinics.
19
It may be that children in the treatment group were taken more often to health clinics because of these mistaken beliefs about conditionality, and that this is responsible for the improvements we observe.
We examine whether treated children receive more health care than untreated children, focusing on two outcomes: (1) an indicator of whether the child had a "growth control" check-up 18 Height is converted into age-and gender-specific z-scores using U.S. norms derived from the CDC growth charts. The test developers for the TVIP provide age-specific norms that can be used to turn the raw score on the test into an age-normed, standardized score; these standardized scores are constructed to have a mean (among the sample used for norming) of 100, and a standard deviation of 15. The Woodcock-Johnson tests are age-normed by converting them into percentiles provided by the test developer. 19 The BDH was also originally designed to condition transfers on sending older children to school. There is evidence from a separate study that mistaken beliefs about the conditionality of the BDH influenced schooling attendance (see Schady and Araujo, 2006.) in the past 6 months, and (2) an indicator of whether the child had a parasite treatment in the past 12 months. Growth control visits-which would have been required had conditionality been imposed-are for preventive care. During the visit, children's growth is monitored, supplements and intestinal parasite treatments are prescribed if necessary, and vaccines are administered.
Intestinal parasites are widespread among children in Ecuador and are associated with stunting and anemia (Sackey, Weigel, and Armijos, 2003) . Regular treatments are necessary since reinfection is common.
The results in Table 5 percent who said they received them from non-clinic-based public programs, and 10.1 who received them from schools (with the remaining 7 percent replying "other" or "don't know"). It is therefore possible that the cash transfers were used to purchase treatments for intestinal parasites in the market. 20 The results for parasite treatments are consistent with the positive program effects on hemoglobin, since parasite infections can reduce hemoglobin levels.
Maternal outcomes
Cash transfers may also have improved women's physical and mental health. These changes, in turn, could have resulted in better outcomes for children. In the US, for example,
there is considerable evidence that shows that depression among mothers is negatively correlated with child cognitive and emotional development, especially among poorer families. (A recent review is Sohr-Preston and Scaramella, 2006.) We therefore examine several maternal outcomes that reflect wealth and nutritional status, as well as maternal mental health and parenting.
We begin by looking at treatment effects on the MacArthur community and Ecuador ladders. The first two rows of Table 6 indicate that, as expected, the treated mothers perceive themselves to be better-off than those in the control group. The effects are largest for poorest mothers, who place themselves (on average) 0.74 of a "rung" higher on the Ecuador ladder, and more than one rung higher on the community ladder. We take this as evidence that transfers were spent in a way that made mothers better off.
The third row of Table 6 indicates that mothers in the treatment group experience improvements in their hemoglobin levels, and that the gains are largest for those in the poorest families. The fact that the BDH improved hemoglobin levels for mothers in much the same way as for children may indicate that the diets of all family members improved. These results are also consistent with those reported in Schady and Rosero (2007) , who show that the food share of households in the BDH treatment group increased at all expenditure levels. 21 We also note that, when mothers in our sample were asked what they spent the BDH transfers on, roughly half (49.2 percent) reported that they spent all or most of the transfer on food, substantially more than those who reported they spent all or most of the transfer on clothing (11.4 percent), education (10.7 percent) or health care (7.9 percent).
Although the poorest mothers in the treatment group experienced improvements in their perceived wealth and in physical health, the same is not true for mental health. The results in Table 6 indicate that the treatment effects for depression and the HOME score (which measures parenting quality) are positive for mothers in the bottom quartile. However, these effects are not statistically significant. The treatment effect for perceived stress is very small, and has the wrong sign. These results suggest that it is unlikely that improvements in children's outcomes are the result of more responsive parenting.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper uses the randomized introduction of a new social program in rural Ecuador to assess the impact of relatively small cash transfers on child health and cognitive development.
Our data are exceptional in that they include information on an unusually rich set of measures of child cognitive development, including language acquisition, short-and long-term memory, and visual integration. We find positive, although modest, effects for the full sample of children.
Effects are much larger for the poorest children, who display improved cognitive outcomes, and fewer reported behavioral problems than children in the control group, as well as higher hemoglobin levels and better fine motor control. Consistent with these results, we find that the nutritional status of families in the treatment group improved, and that children in the treatment group were more likely to receive de-worming treatments.
higher reported consumption of these foods among households in the treatment group. However, measurement error in dietary recall of foods eaten by family members is high, even using a 24-hour rather than a 1-week recall period (Baranowski et al., 1991) .
Our results have important implications for the design of programs that aim to improve outcomes in early childhood. A recent review paper on strategies to promote child development in the developing world pays scant attention to cash transfers (Engle et al., 2007) . Instead, it stresses the importance of programs that "(integrate) health, nutrition, education, social, and economic development" (Engle et al., p. 234) . In rural Ecuador, a much simpler program-one that made relatively modest cash transfers to poor women-led to substantial improvements in child outcomes for the poorest children in the sample.
Several issues require further study. The first is how the design features of cash transfer programs influences outcomes. There is great deal of diversity across countries in how cash transfer programs are structured. In some cases, such as the Mexican Oportunidades program, receipt of money is conditional on specific behaviors, including enrolling children in school and taking pre-school children to health clinics. In other cases, such as the Ecuadorean BDH or the South African Child Support Grant, cash transfers are means-tested but are not conditioned on specific parental behaviors. The effects of conditional and unconditional programs may differ, if the behaviors on which transfers are conditioned influence children's outcomes, or if the conditionality affects program take-up. Conditionality may also interact with the quality of health and educational facilities that are available. This is important as the abysmal quality of clinics in many poor countries is well-documented (for example, Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Banerjee, Duflo and Deaton, 2004; Das and Hammer 2005) .
Programs also differ according to the characteristics of who receives transfers, which in turn may influence outcomes. Many cash transfer programs give money exclusively to mothers.
This could increase women's bargaining capacity within the household, and shift expenditure towards goods that women prefer. It is difficult to examine this issue because most programs, like the BDH, give transfers exclusively to mothers. However, there is some non-experimental data to support the idea that the identity of the recipient matters.
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Finally, programs may have "social marketing" features that influence how transfers alter parental behavior. In Ecuador, although the BDH was not explicitly conditional, it was advertised as a social program intended to benefit children. This could have produced a "flypaper" effect, so that families used these transfers differently from other sources of income.
There is some evidence of flypaper effects from programs in other countries. In the United
States, for example, studies of food stamp "cash outs" suggest that families spend a disproportionate share of their food stamp income on food (Fraker, Martini, and Ohls, 1995; Currie, 1998) . In the Netherlands, spending on children's clothing out of child benefit income is much larger than out of other sources of income (Kooreman, 2000) . However, we know little about whether or how these effects operate in developing countries.
A second issue that deserves further study is whether the younger siblings of the children studied here-who were influenced by the transfers in infancy and even the prenatal period, but were too young to take the cognitive tests administered at follow-up-will display even larger treatment effects. Research on the importance of early "sensitive periods" suggests this may be the case. A final issue is whether the effects of a program like the BDH persist over time, and translate into higher levels of academic achievement and educational attainment. We are planning another round of data collection to address these issues. 22 See, for example, Lundberg et al. (1997) on a British transfer program, as well as the critique of this study by Hotchkiss (2005) . Examples from developing countries include Thomas (1990) and Duflo (2003) . Notes: The sample consists of the group of children ages 3 to 7 (and their families) for whom all 8 child outcomes studied in this paper are non-missing. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the parish level. The child's baseline hemoglobin is elevation adjusted. The child's baseline TVIP score has been normed according to instructions from the test developer (M=100, SD=15). Note that the baseline TVIP is available only for the subsample of children who were at least 36 months of age at baseline. Note: All dependent variables have been converted to z-scores by subtracting the sample median and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. The measures of fine motor control and behavior problems have had their signs reversed so that higher values correspond to better outcomes (i.e. better fine motor control and fewer behavior problems). The sample is restricted to all children ages 3 to 7 years at follow-up, for whom all eight outcomes are measured. The controls for baseline family characteristics include the natural logarithm of imputed family expenditure, an indicator for whether the mother lived with a husband at baseline, the mother's years of education and age, indicators for the numbers of family members in 5 age ranges (0 to 5, 6 to 14, 15 to 44, 45 to 64 and 64 or older) crossed with gender, and the mother's TVIP score. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.
. Note: 1,479 observations without extended controls, and 1,389 observations with extended controls. The sample is restricted to all children ages 3 to 7 years at follow-up for whom all eight outcomes are measured. All dependent variables are measured as z-scores by subtracting the sample median and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. The measures of fine motor control and behavior problems have had their signs reversed, so that higher values correspond to better outcomes (i.e. better fine motor control and fewer behavior problems). The baseline family characteristics are listed in the note to Table 2 . Standard errors are clustered at the parish level. Note: Dependent variables are measured as z-scores by subtracting the sample median and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. The measures of fine motor control and behavior problems have had their signs reversed, so that higher values correspond to better outcomes (i.e. better fine motor control and fewer behavior problems). Standard errors are clustered at the parish level. The sample using published norms has 31 fewer observations than the sample used in Table 4 because, in these cases, one or more outcomes took on values that could not be normed using the published tables. Notes: Regressions control for the age of the mother (in 10-year age bands). Standard errors are clustered at the parish level. The measures of depressive symptoms, perceived stress, and the HOME score are coded so that higher values correspond with better outcomes. Z-scores are computed by subtracting the median and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group.
This data appendix discusses various characteristics of the data, including the criteria for selection in the sample, differences between households that were and were not found at follow-up, and differences between children for whom we have information on all 8 outcomes and those for whom data are missing on at least one outcome.
Sample frame: When the BDH was first launched, the government considered making it a conditional program, similar in its characteristics to PROGRESA in Mexico or to a number of other programs in Latin America. As originally envisioned, households that only had children age 0-6 would have to comply with a requirement that these children make regular visits to health centers. However, households that had children age 7 or older would only have to comply with a requirement that their school-aged children be enrolled in school (regardless of whether these households also had younger children). Since the government expressed an interest in evaluating the effects of the health center requirements, the sample was drawn only from households who had children age 0-6, but no older children. As it turned out, this restriction on the sample was unnecessary ex-post since the health conditions were never announced, implemented, or monitored.
It was also necessary to exclude beneficiaries from the Bono Solidario from the sample frame, as these households had received transfers before the baseline survey was collected. Indeed, since conditionality was never implemented, being transferred from the Bono Solidario to the BDH implied no changes for these households.
We have information from government records for all BDH-eligible families in the parishes we sampled, including their Selben scores, and so can compare the scores of sample-eligible families with those who were excluded due to former Bono Solidario receipt, or because of the presence of older children.
Results of these tabulations for rural parishes are shown in Table A1. The table contains information on BDH-eligible families in the sampled parishes: all are poor, and all have at least one child. These families are divided into those who already received the Bono and those who were newly-eligible; and also into those who had only children under the age of 6 and those who had at least one child age 6 and older. Table A1 indicates that 6,074 families-shown in the bottom right quadrant of the table-were "sample-eligible." The families in our survey were selected from this group.
The results in Table A1 indicate that, as expected, "young" families-those with only younger children-are more likely than others to be newly-eligible: 80.1 percent of these families are newly-eligible, in contrast to 24.7 percent of families with older children. The Selben scores-which range from 11 to 51, with higher values corresponding to greater wealth-indicate that younger families are on average wealthier than older families. (We suspect this is because household size was a factor in assigning Selben scores.) This is true for both newly eligible families and those who were former recipients of the Bono Solidario. Attrition and analysis sample: Table A2 shows that baseline differences between the full sample of households and those that were re-interviewed at follow-up are very small (first two columns in the table). Much the same is the case with regard to differences between the full sample of households and the analysis sample (a comparison of the last two columns in the table), except for age: Children who are missing outcomes, and are therefore not included in the analysis sample, tend to be younger than other children. This pattern is consistent with mothers being more reluctant to subject younger children to a blood draw, or interviewers finding it more difficult for younger children to cooperate with cognitive tests. The majority of missing values were due to the mother being unwilling to allow the finger-prick blood draw required for the hemoglobin measurement (441 cases). Other missing values were due to a variety of causes, such as an invalid height measurement or the failure to take a cognitive test. Table A3 , finally, shows that children who are missing at least one outcome tend to do worse in terms of their scores for other outcomes, even after controlling for the fact that they are, on average, younger. Note: These computations are for the group of 32,381 families who were in the sampled rural parishes, in Selben quintiles 1 & 2, and had at least one child in the household of any age, making them BDH-eligible. This group is classified into those who are former Bono recipients and those who are newly eligible for the BDH (across the columns), and those who had at least 1 child age 6 and older and those who had no children age 6 or older (down the rows). Our sample was drawn from the17,987 families in the bottom right portion of the table: newly eligible families with no children age 6 or older. Notes: Only children at baseline who would have been between ages 36 and 95 months at follow-up are included in this analysis. The child's TVIP is measured only for children who were at least 36 months old at baseline. (0.67) Note: All child outcomes except age have been converted to z-scores, and the signs of fine motor control and behavior problems have been reversed so that higher values correspond to better outcomes. The last column shows t-tests for whether the mean for the sample with no missing outcomes is equal to that for the sample with missing outcomes. For all variables except age, these tests are based on variables are age-and sex-adjusted, i.e. we regressed each variable on an indicator for whether the child has at least one missing outcome, a complete set of age indicators, and an indicator of the child is male. These regressions have standard errors that are clustered at the parish level.
